



Extraterritoriality -  
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In international human rights discourse, the concept of universalism has 
been key since the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, and the labelling of the 
1948 Declaration as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) signifies 
the importance of this concept.  Added to this, the strong position of the non-
discrimination provisions in the Charter, the UDHR and all subsequent human 
rights treaties and declarations, is further evidence of the primacy of universal 
and non-discriminatory enjoyment of human rights.  This was also confirmed by 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its determination that the practice of 
apartheid was a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter.2  Yet, in the development of human rights law and its implementation 
through national and international bodies, the concept of universalism has been 
rather one-sided:  it concerns human rights enjoyment, but not human rights 
obligations.  While all individuals everywhere are considered to have the same 
rights based on international law, the obligation-holders (normally states) do not 
have the same obligations with regard to individuals everywhere. According to 
common perceptions of human rights obligations, whether a state can in any way 
be held responsible for human rights violations depends not only on the state’s 
actions, but indeed where those actions took place, and/or the nationality of the 
victims of violations.  
 
However, this way of looking at obligations has in recent times been 
questioned by a number of actors in the international human rights community.  
Academics,3 policy makers,4 non-governmental organisations (NGOs),5 and 
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international institutions (as discussed below)  have begun to question the logic 
of this approach, and indeed the legal justifications for it.  A significant number of 
international court cases have also in recent years debated the reach of 
international human rights obligations.6  Thus, the altered approach is to address 
whether states have obligations in regard to the human rights effects on 
individuals in other states as a result of actions and omissions in their 
international cooperation or foreign policy.  
 
There are different reasons for this shift in attention concerning these 
obligations.  One of the more obvious reasons is the phenomenon of 
‘globalisation’, understood in a broad sense.  The increased international 
interaction among states; between states and international institutions; and 
between states and private entities, such as multinational corporations (MNCs), 
may have positive or negative effects on the human rights situation outside the 
control of the territorial state.  The more far-reaching international regulation of 
financial matters and trade, combined with an emphasis on certain economic 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kreijen, State. Sovereignty, and International Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002; Narula, S. 
"The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under International Law", 44, Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, 2006,  691-800;Sepulveda, M.  "Obligations of 'International Assistance and 
Cooperation' in an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," 
24, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2006,  271-303; Gibney, Mark, Terminology, University of 
Tilburg, 11, 2008, Rice, Xan, The Water Margin, London, 2007, Andersson, Annelie, Mixed Messages?  On 
EU Policy Coherence and the Right to Food in Latin America, FIAN and UBV Latinamerika, 2007, Skogly, 
Sigrun I., Beyond National Borders: States' Human Rights Obligations in International Cooperation, Antwerp, 
Intersentia, 2006, Wilde, Ralph, Legal "Black Hole"? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty 
Law on Civil and Political Rights, 26, Michigan Journal of International Law, 2005,  739-806; , Sepulveda, 
Magdalena, Obligations of 'International Assistance and Cooperation' in an Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 24, Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights, 2006,  271-303; , Wilde, Ralph, Casting light on the 'Legal Black Hole': Some Political Issues at 
Stake, European Human Rights Law Review, 2006,  552-557; , Narula, Smita, The Right to Food: Holding 
Global Actors Accountable Under International Law, 44, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2006,  691-
800; , Mesquita, Judith Bueno de, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Obligations of International Assistance and Cooperation, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, 2002, 
Howard, Jack Donnelly and Rhoda E., Human Rights Self-Monitoring: A Proposal for the Northern European 
Democracies, Chr. Michelsen's Institute, 1996, Kamminga, Fons Coomans and Menno T., Comparative 
Introductory Comments on the Extraterritorial application of Human Rights Treaties, F. C. a. M. T. 
Kamminga, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004, Hunt, Paul, 
Report of the Special Rapportuer on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, Paul Hunt, UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/4/28, 2007, Harding, 
Andrew, Kenyan Women in Rape Protest, London, 2, 2003, Lawson, Rick, The Concept of Jurisdiction and 
Extraterritorial Acts of State, G. Kreijen, State. Soverignty, and International Governance, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, Clapham, Andrew, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006,. 
4 This is, inter alia, the position taken by the Norwegian government in its white paper from 1999 “Human 
dignity in focus” (menneskeverd I sentrum) where it states that “[t]he government will clearly give priority to 
work towards improved compliance with human rights obligations at home as well as abroad”; and 
“Norwegian development assistance shall contribute to enhance the ability of recipient countries to meet 
their human rights obligations.”  The Norwegian Government, Foreign Office, White Paper to the Norwegian 
Parliament, no. 21 (1999/2000), Section 2: The International Human Rights Efforts, pages 12 and 48 of 93 
(url version).  Translated by author.  
5 See, eg,  FIAN, Compliance of Belgium with its Obligations under the International Covenant On 
Economic, Social and Cutural Rights, FIAN Belgium et al, 2007; 3D, US and EU Cotton Production and 
Export Policies and Their Impact on West and Central Africa: Coming to Grips with International Human 
Rights Obligations, 3D, No date  
6 Several of these cases will be referred to in some details in the following sections of this chapter.  
 3
models, the compliance with which are imperative for international assistance, 
have resulted in nation states being less able to control events within their own 
borders and direct development in ways that they themselves choose.   
 
This increased interaction and interdependence of states in the 
international community has resulted in a debate that questions whether states 
have obligations that go beyond their national borders, and include human rights 
problems caused by the actions or omissions of one state in the territory of 
another state.  The question raised is whether the foreign state fails to comply 
with legal obligations if its actions or omissions result in human rights violations 
abroad.  This debate concerns questions that have been addressed through the 
use of different terms: extraterritorial obligations, transnational obligations, 
international obligations, or global obligations, to mention the most common.  
While these terms do not necessarily signify the exact same phenomenon,7 the 
main aim of this discussion is to address the problem that may occur if one state 
acts in a manner whereby its actions undermine human rights for individuals in 
another country.  For the purpose of this chapter, I will use the term 
“extraterritorial obligations”.8 
 
The Content of Extraterritorial Obligations 
 
 Before discussing the legal foundation for, and current obstacles to the 
implementation of, extraterritorial obligations, it is necessary to dwell briefly on 
what the content of such obligations are.  It was alluded to in the introduction that 
the understanding of what human rights obligations are has become more 
sophisticated and nuanced in the past two decades.  While human rights 
obligations were initially thought to be mainly negative (to refrain from interfering 
with individuals’ human rights enjoyment), both the language in the various 
human rights treaties and the jurisprudence from human rights courts and 
committees have confirmed that such an approach is too limited.  Indeed, it is 
now generally accepted that human rights obligations are of both negative and 
positive nature, in that states are obliged not only to refrain from violating rights, 
but also to take steps to ensure human rights enjoyment.  This is the case for 
economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights.9  
Furthermore, based on works by Henry Shue10 and Asbjørn Eide,11 a common 
understanding of three levels of obligations has emerged: the obligation to 
                                                 
7 For a discussion on the various terms used in these discussions see Gibney, Mark, Terminology, 
University of Tilburg, 11, 2008, 24-26 January 2008. On file with author 
8 For a discussion as to why I have chosen to use this term in my work on the issue, see Skogly, Sigrun I., 
Beyond National Borders: States' Human Rights Obligations in International Cooperation, Antwerp, 
Intersentia, 2006, p. 5 
9 Maastricht Guidelines, Guideline no. 6.  The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights were adopted by a group of experts that met in Maastricht in January 1997.  The Guidelines 
are reprinted at (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 691 and can be accessed at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html   
10  Shue, H Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence , and U.S. Foreign Policy, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1996, (sec. ed.), p. 52 
11 Eide, A. The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, (UN/Commission on Human Rights, Report on 
the Right to Adequate Food by A. Eide, Special Rapporteur, UN.Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23, 7 July 1987) 
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respect, to protect, and to fulfil.12  These levels of obligations have been 
explained in the Maastricht Guidelines:  
 
The obligation to respect requires States to refrain from interfering with the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Thus, the right to housing is 
violated if the State engages in arbitrary forced evictions. The obligation to 
protect requires States to prevent violations of such rights by third parties. Thus, 
the failure to ensure that private employers comply with basic labour standards 
may amount to a violation of the right to work or the right to just and favourable 
conditions of work. The obligation to fulfil requires States to take appropriate 
legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full 
realization of such rights. Thus, the failure of States to provide essential primary 
health care to those in need may amount to a violation.13  
 
According to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the same levels apply to extraterritorial (international) obligations14.  The 
obligation to respect implies that a state has to respect the human rights for 
individuals in another country when entering into cooperation with, or carrying out 
foreign policy (including military activity) that impacts on these individuals.  The 
obligation to protect refers to the activities of private parties, and therefore entails 
that states have an obligation to ensure that private parties (including private 
businesses) over which they assert (jurisdictional or other) control do not violate 
the rights of individuals in other states.15  Finally, the obligation to fulfil requires 
states to take such measures that are necessary for the full realisation of rights in 
other states.   
 
This final point is by far the most controversial element of extraterritorial 
obligations.  Without going into the details of the debates concerning this level of 
extraterritorial obligation,16 and the problems that it may raise in terms of 
sovereignty of the home state of individuals facing human rights problems, as 
well as the practical problems of resources available for full realisation of all 
                                                 
12 In a follow-up study on the right to adequate food, Eide proposes two separate elements of the fulfil part of 
obligations: to promote and to facilitate. See Eide, Eide, Asbjórn, The Right to Adequate Food and to be 
Free From Hunger.  Updated study on the right to food, UN Subcommission on human rights, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12, 1999 
13 Maastricht Guidelines, Guideline no. 6.  Please note that the focus here is on violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights.  However, the sentence preceding the quoted part above states: “Like civil and 
political rights, economic, social and cultural rights impose three different types of obligations on States: the 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. Failure to perform any one of these three obligations constitutes a 
violation of such rights.” 
14 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights refers to extraterritorial obligations as 
‘international obligations’.  
15 In General Comment no. 15 on the Right to Water, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights confirms that ‘international obligations’ includes that “ Steps should be taken by States parties to 
prevent their own citizens and companies from violating the right to water of individuals and communities in 
other countries.” (para. 33)  Likewise, in General Comment no. 14 on the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, the same Committee confirms that “To comply with their international obligations in 
relation to article 12, States parties have to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, 
and to prevent third parties from violating the right in other countries, if they are able to influence these third 
parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
applicable international law.” (para. 39).  
16 For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see Skogly 2006, Chapter 3.   
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human rights in foreign states, it should be noted that the special rapporteur on 
the Right to Food, Mr. Jean Ziegler, introduced the concept of ‘support fulfilment’ 
of rights in other states. He explained this terminology in the following manner:  
 
It underlines that the principal obligation to guarantee the right to food is 
incumbent on the national Government, but other States, if they have available 
resources, have a complementary obligation to help the national State, when it 
does not have the resources to realize the right to food of its population.17 
 
Legal Foundation for Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations 
 
 While states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations often have been 
ignored, this does not imply that they are non-existent, nor that there are no legal 
foundations for such obligations.  Indeed, extraterritorial human rights obligations 
have their grounding in international human rights law, and this has been 
confirmed by international courts and committees.  It should be noted that the 
jurisprudence in this area is not conclusive, and that different approaches have 
been taken by different international institutions, and that even the same 
institution may not appear to be consistent in its application of extraterritorial 
obligations.18 
 
a) The UN Charter 
Little attention has been given to the possibility that the UN Charter 
provides for more than domestic human rights obligations.  Commonly, the 
Charter is criticized for not being specific enough in terms of human rights and 
the corresponding obligations.  However, there may be more in the Charter than 
has been recognized.  
 
Article 1 of the Charter establishes the purposes of the organisation, and 
as members of the UN each individual state is bound by the Charter, and has 
obligations to assist in fulfilling these obligations. The fundamental principle of 
universal and international protection of human rights is provided in article 1(3). It 
is the  
“Purposes of the United Nations [to] achieve international co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, 
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all …”  (emphasis added).   
 
The inclusion of the passage that the organisation’s purpose is, inter alia, 
to ‘achieve international co-operation’ in relationship to the substantive content of 
the rest of the paragraph, is not insignificant in relation to the question of 
extraterritorial human rights obligations.  If international cooperation is to be 
achieved, the members of the UN will have an obligation to contribute to this 
cooperation which is aimed at addressing problems of economic, social, 
                                                 
17 UN/Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Mr. Jean 
Ziegler, (5ht Report), UN. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/47 para. 47.  
18 This thesis will be further discussed in the section on ‘Obstacles’ below.  
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humanitarian and human rights character.  If member states of the United 
Nations claim that human rights obligations are uniquely territorial, this would 
disregard the principle of international cooperation in Article 1.   
 
Further, articles 55 and 56 provide that the United Nations shall promote 
‘universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all …’,19 and that this shall be done through “joint and separate 
action in co-operation with the Organization…”.20  These articles are commonly 
referred to in UN documents when the international promotion of human rights is 
discussed.  However, until recently, there has been little interpretation of the 
obligations that stem from these two articles.21   
 
In an elaboration of the legislative history and interpretation of Article 56, it 
is explained that the text is a compromise between a wording suggested by 
Australia, and the views of the United States in the drafting process.22  Australia 
had proposed that “all members of the UN should pledge to take action, on both 
national and international levels, for the purpose of securing for all peoples, 
including their own, such goals as improved labour standards”23 and thus 
suggested a formulation in which the pledge would mean that the “members 
would both co-operate internationally and act within their own countries to pursue 
the economic and social objectives of the Organization, in their own way and 
without interference in their domestic affairs by the Organization”.24  This was 
opposed by the US, as it claimed that all that could be included in the Charter 
was to provide for “collective action and thus it could not oblige a nation to take 
separate action because that would constitute an infringement upon the internal 
affairs of the member states”.25  Thus, the interpretation of the article has tended 
to accept a compromise of the two positions, whereby the: 
 
rather limited obligatory function of Article 56 is […] the result of the 
wording of Article 55, to which it refers.  The latter only describes 
purposes (and not substantive obligations) to be achieved by means of co-
operation.  To this extent, Article 56 can thus only create substantive 
obligations (as opposed to procedural obligations) in so far as Article 55 
contains a corresponding basis in that respect.26  
 
                                                 
19 UN Charter, Article 55 (c) (emphasis added)  
20 UN Charter, Article 56 
21 A recent book carries interesting interpretation of these articles: Salomon, Margot E Global Responsibility 
for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of International Law, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, pp. 67-71. 
22 Simma, Bruno (ed.) The Charter of the United Nations – A Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1994, p. 793. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Discussion UNCIO X, Doc. 699, II/3/30 and Doc. 747, II/3/46, pp. 139-40.  As cited in Simma, Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 794. 
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 However, Simma holds that Article 55 (c) contains substantive obligations 
in respect to human rights,27 and it can thus be held that in terms of human 
rights, articles 55 and 56 in conjunction establish obligations to take action to 
promote the respect for human rights. According to this interpretation, there is a 
firm obligation for states to act individually as well as collectively to promote 
respect for human rights.    
 
It is, however, interesting to note that the opposition by the United States 
was did not concern the international obligations, but rather that the UN Charter 
could not prescribe what states should do domestically.  As domestic human 
rights obligations have now gained virtually universal acceptance, it is rather 
paradoxical that the international (or extraterritorial) obligations have become the 
controversial ones. 
 
The meaning of ‘jointly’ as used in article 56 is not quite clear though.  In 
Simma’s commentary on the UN Charter, the meaning of the term ‘joint’ is not 
substantially discussed.28  However, “jointly” could imply action through the 
United Nations, as a way to practically carry out the organisation’s mandate, in 
recognition that the organisation may not be able to fulfil its purposes without 
joint commitment from the membership.  However, the interpretation that this 
would be the entire meaning of ‘joint action’ in article 56 seems too narrow.  The 
article provides that this joint action shall take place ‘in cooperation with the 
organisation.’  If it was intended to imply a narrow obligation to promote respect 
for human rights through the work of the United Nations, one would have 
expected the wording to reflect this, for instance by saying ‘joint and separate 
action through the United Nations’. But this wording was not chosen.  Rather, a 
wider formulation is used, and the understanding of ‘joint’ therefore implies an 
obligation to act jointly to promote respect for human rights, and also that this 
implies an obligation to cooperate with the United Nations in this regard.29  This 
joint action has a clear extra-territorial element to it: only one of the states acting 
‘jointly’ may at any given time address the promotion of the respect for human 
rights domestically – all the other states involved in the joint action will logically 
be addressing respect for human rights in another state.  
 
Furthermore, article 56 does not only call for joint action, but indeed also 
‘separate’ action in cooperation with the United Nations.  These words, seen in 
conjunction with the provision in Article 55 (c), which calls for ‘universal’ respect 
for human rights, further strengthens arguments for human rights obligations 
beyond national borders for individual states.  As the article uses the term 
‘universal’ rather than ‘domestic’, it is submitted that this wording has 
extraterritorial implications, and that it adds to the Charter’s non-discrimination 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 The seminal work by Simma covers 1400 pages.  However, only three pages are devoted to Article 56.  
Very little scholarly work on this article is found elsewhere.  
29 Simma, p. 948  
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principle, in that states shall promote respect for human rights not only of their 
own populations, but indeed universally as well. 
 
In addition to the UN Charter, the various specific human rights treaties 
are the main sources of human rights obligations.  Some of these treaties have 
provisions which give a specific content to extraterritorial obligations, while others 
have been interpreted to contain such obligations without specific mention in the 
treaty text.30 
 
There are three international human rights treaties that are specifically 
important based on their own provisions for the discussions on extraterritorial 
obligations.  These are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’),31 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’),32 
and the newly adopted and entered into force) Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’).33  
 
b) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
The ICESCR is particularly interesting in any discussion on extraterritorial 
human rights obligations.34  Not only does Article 2(1) of the Covenant refer 
specifically to the States Parties’ obligations to take steps ‘individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation’35 for the realisation of the 
rights guaranteed,  but it also omits the reference to ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘territory’ 
which is common in other human rights instruments.36  This being so, the 
understanding of the content of the extraterritorial obligations stemming from this 
provision in article 2(1) has not been significantly developed.37   The Committee 
                                                 
30 The scope of this chapter does not permit a full and in-depth discussion of the legal sources for 
extraterritorial obligations.  For a deeper analysis, see Skogly, 2006; and Kamminga, Fons Coomans and M. 
T., Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004,. 
31 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 1966, entered into force 1976.  As of January 2008, 
157 States have ratified the Covenant. (Hereinafter: ICESCR) 
32 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989, entered into force in 1990.  As of January 
2008, 193 states have ratified this Convention.  (Hereinafter CRC)  
33 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 2006.  On April 3, 2008 the CRDP 
received its 20th ratification, which, according to Article 45 of the Convention, triggers its entry into force 30 
days later.  The CRDP consequently entered into force on May 3, 2008, less than 18 months after its 
adoption (13 December 2006). As of  January 2008, 14 States have ratified this Convention.  According to 
Article 45, the Convention will enter into force thirty days after the twentieth instrument of ratification has 
been received.  
34
 In this chapter, I will only address Article 2(1) of the Covenant.  I have addressed the significance of other 
articles in the Covenant in other publications: see generally Skogly, Sigrun I.  “The obligation of international 
assistance and co-operation in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, in 
Bergsmo Morten (ed.) Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden, Kluwer Law International, 
2003; and Skogly, 2006, p. 83-98.  
35 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR reads: “ Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.” 
36 For the text of these instruments, see footnotes 94-96 below and accompanying text.  
37 In General Comment no. 3 (1990), the Committee referred to this passage as indicating that ‘available 
resources’ included those available through international assistance’ (para. 13), and that read in conjunction 
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on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has in later years, however, begun to 
include explicit and implicit references to this provision in its General Comments 
and in questioning of and concluding observations to states’ reports.38   
 
 A review of some of the drafting history of article 2(1) sheds light on the 
debates that took place in the 1950s and 60s.  As has been documented 
elsewhere,39 there was some discussion over the inclusion of the passage 
‘international assistance and co-operation’ in the article.  The discussions in the 
Commission on Human Rights and in the General Assembly’s Third Committee 
were, however, not conclusive as to the drafting parties’ intentions.  What did 
seem rather clear though, was that international co-operation and assistance was 
seen as necessary if the Covenant’s rights were to be realised.  What was more 
discussed was the nature of this cooperation, and whether the added provision of 
‘especially economic and technical’ was too limited.40  International assistance 
and cooperation was included as one of the means of realisation of the right in 
the original (and subsequent) general obligation provision of the Covenant.  
However, more than 50 years later, it has proven to be one of the more 
controversial aspects of the document.    
 
c) The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
As is the case for the ICESCR, the CRC also incorporates specific 
obligations of international assistance and cooperation in regard to economic, 
social and cultural rights.  Article 4 states that: 
 
 “States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, 
and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
with Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, that “… international cooperation for development and thus for the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States.  It is particularly incumbent 
upon those States which are in a position to assist others in this regard.” (para. 14); The Limburg Principles, 
paragraphs 29 – 34, deal with this passage in article 2(1), but use rather general terms, such as 
‘international co-operation and assistance shall’ give priority to ‘the realization of all human rights …’; and 
that it should contribute to the establishment of a social and international order conducive to human rights.  
There is no clear indication as to the content of obligations for states. The Limburg Principles on the 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were adopted by a group of distinguished experts in 
international law, convened by the International Commission of Jurists, the Faculty of Law of the University 
of Limburg (Maastricht, the Netherlands) and the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, University of 
Cincinnati (Ohio, United States of America), met in Maastricht on 2-6 June 1986.  These principles can inter 
alia be access through the International Human Rights Obligations Network (IntHRON) at: 
http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/organisations/humanrights/inthron/index.php Additionally a briefing paper on the 
content of ‘international assistance and cooperation’ in Article 2 was given to the Committee in 2002.  See 
“International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: Obligations Of International Assistance 
And Cooperation” A Briefing Paper by Judith Bueno de Mesquita, Senior Research Officer, Human Rights 
Centre, University of Essex.  On file with author.   
38 For a detailed analysis of the way in which the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
approached this issue, see Sepulveda, Magdalena, Obligations of 'International Assistance and 
Cooperation' in an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
24, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2006,  271-303;  
39
 Skogly, S, 2003, p. 403 – 420.  
40 General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Third Committee 1204th meeting, Official Records, para. 49.  
For further discussions on this, see Skogly, Ibid, pp. 407-412 
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present Convention.  With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, 
States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of 
their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of 
international cooperation.”41 
 
During the drafting of this article, there were a number of issues debated, 
including the reference to ‘available resources’.42  However, what is noticeable in 
this context is that the inclusion of ‘international co-operation’ was already 
included in the first draft of the convention text presented by Poland in January 
1980, and it was readily accepted, and not considered controversial, as 
evidenced by the lack of debate about it.43   
 
Contrary to the position of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has not dealt with the 
concept of international co-operation as part of the treaty obligations in any 
detail. The only aspect of international co-operation that is included in the 
Committee’s General Comments44 relates to the seeking of international 
assistance, and does not include recognition of extraterritorial obligations.45 
 
d) The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
 
A recent addition to international human rights law was made with the 
adoption and entry into force of the CRPD.  There are two articles that 
specifically address international cooperation: Article 4 ‘General Obligations’ and 
Article 32 ‘International Cooperation’.  Article 4 (2) provides that: 
 
 With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, each State Party 
undertakes to take measures to the maximum of its available resources 
and, where needed, within the framework of international cooperation, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of these rights, without 
prejudice to those obligations contained in the present Convention that are 
immediately applicable according to international law.   
 
In contrast to Article 2(1) of ICESCR, the article only refers to ‘international 
cooperation’ rather than ‘international assistance and cooperation’.  As 
international assistance (technical, financial, humanitarian) is now commonly 
seen to be part of international cooperation,46 this difference is unlikely to imply a 
more narrow sphere for the extraterritorial obligations.   
 
                                                 
41 Emphasis added.  
42 Skogly, 2006, p. 103 
43 Skogly, 2006, p. 104 
44 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment no. 5 “General Measures of Implementation of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child”, October 2003.   
45 Skogly, 2006, p. 159-160.  
46 For further discussions on this, see Salomon,  2007, pp. 98-109; 
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The second article that deals with international cooperation, Article 32, 
emphasises ‘the importance of international cooperation and its promotion, in 
support of national efforts for the realization of the purpose and objectives of the 
present Convention, …’.  This refers to the same concept as Ziegler labelled 
‘obligation to support fulfilment’.47 It then continues to call for international 
development programmes that are inclusive and accessible to persons with 
disabilities; 48  to facilitate and support capacity building;49 research 
cooperation;50 and to provide technical assistance and technology transfer.51  
Finally, the Article ends with: 
 
 The Provisions of this article are without prejudice to the obligations of 
each State Party to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention.52  
 
This final passage is of particular interest, as it addresses some of the 
concerns opponents to extraterritorial obligations have voiced, namely that states 
(and particularly poorer states) will feel relieved of their treaty obligations, as they 
can advocate that they need external funding to implement the rights in the 
treaties.  This provision emphasises the primary obligation for the territorial state 
to comply with its obligations and carry out its implementation.   
 
e) Other human rights treaties 
 
It is noticeable that the specific treaties discussed so far all address economic, 
social and cultural rights in relation to extraterritorial obligations.  One could then 
easily conclude that any extraterritorial human rights obligations are confined to 
that part of international human rights law.  However, such an interpretation 
would not reflect the current understanding of international human rights treaties.  
Indeed, the ICJ, the UN Human Rights Committee (which monitors the 
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), the 
European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights have all confirmed that international human rights treaties 
protecting civil and political rights contain obligations for the states parties that go 
beyond the national territory.  This is in spite of the clauses in some of these 
treaties providing that the states parties are to protect and ensure the rights 
within their territory and/or their jurisdiction.53 In the Namibia (South West Africa) 
Opinion, the ICJ found that South Africa, having established a system of 
apartheid in the neighbouring state, was in breach of its international obligations 
under the UN Charter.  Therefore, the fact that South Africa acted outside of its 
own territory was of no consequence; the Court still found that South Africa was 
                                                 
47 See footnote 20 above and accompanying text.  
48 Article 32 (1) (a)  
49 Article 32 (1) (b) 
50 Article 32 (1) (c)  
51 Article 32 (1) (d)  
52 Article 32 (2) 
53 For text, see footnote 94-96 Below.  
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in breach of its obligations.54   Furthermore, in the advisory opinion on the ‘Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory’, the ICJ considered the relevance of obligations stemming from human 
rights treaties that Israel has ratified.  In regard to the ICCPR, the Court held that 
it was applicable ‘in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction outside its own territory’.55 Likewise, in respect of the ICESCR, the 
Court held that  
 
The territories occupied by Israel have for over 37 years been subject to its 
territorial jurisdiction as the Occupying Power.  In the exercise of the powers 
available to it on this basis, Israel is bound by the provisions of the ICESCR.56 
Likewise, in Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, the Human Rights Committee held 
that  
“it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the 
[ICCPR] as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the 
territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own 
territory.”57   
Adding his individual opinion to this case, Committee Member Mr. 
Tomuschat held that  
Never was it envisaged … to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power 
to carry out wilful and deliberate attacks against the freedom and personal 
integrity of their citizens living abroad.58 
While this case concerned the abduction and arrest of a Uruguayan citizen 
living abroad by members of the Uruguayan security forces, and the question 
before the Committee became whether a state had the same obligations towards 
its citizens abroad as at home,59 it is probably reasonable to suggest that 
Tomuschat’s opinion could also be applied to foreigners abroad and that states 
should not have ‘unfettered discretionary power to carry out wilful and deliberate 
attacks against the freedom and personal integrity’ of individuals in other states.  
This understanding is supported by another passage in his statement, where he 
                                                 
54 See footnote 2 above. 
55 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, General List No. 131, para. 111. 
56 Ibid. para. 112.  
57 Lopez Burgos v Uruguay (52/79), Human Rights Committee (find full reference), as quoted in Joseph, S 
et.al ed. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.60.   
58 Ibid., p. 184 
59 In this respect, the case is similar to that heard by the European Court of Human Rights in Őcalan v. 
Turkey, where Mr. Őcalan, a Turkish citizen, was arrested by Turkish authorities at the international airport 
in Nairobi, Kenya, and brought back to Turkey.  The Court considered that ‘directly after being handed over 
to the Turkish officials, the applicant was effectively under Turkish authority and therefore within the 
“jurisdiction” of that State for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, even though in this instance Turkey 
exercised its authority outside its territory.’  Eur.Crt.HR, Őcalan v. Turkey, Application no. 46221/99, 
Judgment, 12 May 2005, para. 91).  
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holds that the “words ‘within its territory’ … was intended to take care of objective 
difficulties which might impede the implementation of the Covenant in specific 
situations.”60 
This view is confirmed both by the Committee against Torture (CAT), and 
the Human Rights Committee in their deliberations and conclusions regarding the 
United States’ reports concerning inter alia the conditions at Guantanomo Bay.  
In its concluding observations from 2006 CAT “reiterates its previously expressed 
view that “territory under [the State party’s] jurisdiction” includes all areas under 
the de facto effective control of the State party, by whichever military or civil 
authorities such control is exercised. The Committee considers that the State 
party’s view that those provisions are geographically limited to its own de jure 
territory to be regrettable.”61 Likewise, the Human Rights Committee has noted “with 
concern the restrictive interpretation made by the State party of its obligations 
under the Covenant, as a result in particular of (a) its position that the Covenant 
does not apply with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction but outside its 
territory, nor in time of war, despite the contrary opinions and established 
jurisprudence of the Committee and the International Court of Justice; … The 
State party should in particular (a) acknowledge the applicability of the Covenant 
with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction but outside its territory …”62 
 
 The European Court of Human Rights has also found that actions by a 
High Contracting Party beyond its territory may be in breach of that State’s 
obligations.  In Loizidou v Turkey,63 which concerned the ability of a Greek-
Cypriot to access her property in Northern Cyprus after the Turkish occupation of 
that part of the island, the Turkish government argued that the case could not be 
admissible as it concerned an area outside the territory of Turkey. However, the 
European Court clearly stated that a state’s responsibility for its own acts can 
reach outside the territorial jurisdiction of that state.  The Court held that the 
 
responsibility of Contracting Parties can be involved because of acts of their 
authorities, whether performed within or outside national boundaries, which 
produce effects outside their own territory.64 
 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has taken a 
similar view in cases involving transnational human rights obligations.  In 
Armando Alejandre Jr. and Others v Cuba65 the petitioners complained to the 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 UN Committee Against Torture, Colcusions and recommendations, United States of America, UN Doc. 
CAT/C/USA/CO/2, 25 July 2006, para. 15.  
62 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, United States of America, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, 18 December 2006, para. 10. 
63 The European Court of Human Rights, Loizidou judgment (Loizidou v Turkey) of 23 March 1995, Series A. 
no. 310 
64 Ibid. p. 24, para. 62 
65 Armando Alejandre Jr and Others v Cuba ("Brothers to the Rescue"), Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights, report No. 86/99, case no. 11.589, 29 September 1999 
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IACHR about the death of four individuals caused by the shooting down of two 
civilian aircrafts by a Cuban military MIG-29.  The civilian aircrafts were in 
international territory when they were shot down.  The IACHR held Cuba 
responsible for violating the right to life and to a fair trial of the victims, and stated 
the following with regard to the extraterritorial nature of the acts:  
 
 "The fact that the events took place outside Cuban jurisdiction, does not limit the 
Commission's competence ratione loci, because, as previously stated, when 
agents of a state, whether military or civilian, exercise power and authority over 
persons outside national territory, the state's obligation to respect human rights 
continues - in this case the rights enshrined in the American Declaration.  The 
Commission finds conclusive evidence that agents of the Cuban State, although 
outside their territory, placed the civilian pilots of the 'Brothers to the Rescue' 
organization under their authority.  Consequently, the Commission is competent 
ratione loci to apply the American Convention extraterritorially to the Cuban State 
in connection with the events that took place in international airspace on 
February 24, 1996." 66 
 
 
            In this case, the IACHR recognised that Cuba was acting outside its 
territorial jurisdiction, but that in certain circumstances it is not only consistent 
with, but also required by, the applicable rules to hold a state accountable for 
acts outside its territory.67 
 
This recital of cases by international courts and opinions by monitoring 
Committees should not be taken as an indication that extraterritorial obligations 
in relations to human rights are necessarily always accepted, and that they are 
not seen as controversial by many institutions and human rights lawyers. Indeed, 
the European Court on Human Rights has stated that only ‘in exceptional 
circumstances’ can obligations go beyond the territory of the state.68 
Furthermore, the ICJ has gone to great lengths to avoid apportioning 
responsibility to states whose conduct contributes to human rights violations in 
third countries.69  This reality calls for an assessment of the obstacles to full 
recognition of extraterritorial obligations.  
 
                                                 
66 Ibid. para. 25.  
67 Ibid., para. 23.  
68 Vlastimir and Borka BANKOVIĆ, Živana STOJANOVIĆ, Mirjana STOIMENOVSKI, Dragana JOKSIMOVIĆ 
and Dragan SUKOVIĆ; against Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom. European Court of Human Rights , Application no. 52207/99, para. 80  (Hereinafter: 
Bankovic case), para.  71.  
69 This thesis is evident both in the Nicaragua case (Nicaragua vs. United States of America, Judgment 17 
June, 1986,  ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14-150; ) and the Genocide case (Case Concerning the Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v 
Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment 27 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007) For a critical appraisal of these 
cases and the implication for state responsibility for breaches of extraterritorial obligations,  see Gibney, 
Mark, Genocide and State Responsibility, 7, Human Rights Law Review, 2007,  760-773;  
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Obstacles to the recognition of extraterritorial obligations 
 
There are a number of obstacles to the development of a consensus 
regarding the content of states’ obligations for their involvement in human rights 
violations in other states.  Some are obstacles in (the interpretation of) the law 
and others are of a more political nature.   
 
a) State responsibility 
 
According to the International Law Commission’s Articles on 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘ILC Articles’),70 if a state 
commits an act or omits to carry out prescribed conduct and this act or omission 
represents a breach of an international obligation, the state has committed an 
internationally wrongful act for which it is responsible.71  The ILC Articles also set 
out the legal consequences for such unlawful acts.72  This is a reflection of the 
reciprocal character of international law as between states.  However, state 
responsibility is not commonly invoked in situations where the actions of one 
state breach or threaten the human rights of individuals in another state.   
 
Inter-state complaint procedures existing in some of the regional human rights 
systems,73 and in some of the international conventions adopted through the 
United Nations system.74 These procedures, while sparingly used, are somewhat 
different from the regular application of state responsibility, as they are 
procedures specifically provided for in certain treaties, and are not reactions to 
breaches of normal reciprocal international law obligations independent of 
specific treaty-based procedures.  Yet, the inter-state complaint procedures 
underscore the argument that international human rights treaties operate 
according to the general principles contained in the Law of Treaties.  It is the 
reciprocal obligations undertaken by ratifying the treaty that is essential, not the 
nationality of the individual whose rights have been violated.  In order to complain 
about the treatment of its own citizen abroad, a state need not rely on human 
rights treaties to seek redress, as customary international law principles 
regarding diplomatic protection cover that issue.75  
 
                                                 
70 Adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf  (Hereinafter ‘ILC Articles’) 
71 ILC Articles, Articles 1 and 2.  
72 ILC Articles, Part II.  
73 See Article 33 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) as 
amended by Protocol 11; American Convention on Human Rights provides for a similar procedure in Article 
44; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 47.  None of these procedures has been 
significantly used.    
74 Interstate complaints procedures are available under the ICCPR, the Convention against Torture; the 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; and the Convention on the Protection of All Rights of 
Migrant Workers and their Families, all contain such procedures.  As of November 2007, no such complaints 
have been filed in the UN system.  
75 This issue relates to the discussion about minimum standards of treatment of citizens of another state, an 
issue that goes beyond the scope of this essay. For a discussion on this, see Cassese, Antonio, 
International Law, 2nd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 120.      
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  Therefore, when entering into international human rights treaties, states not 
only guarantee that they will treat their inhabitants according to the standards 
provided in the treaties, but also that they are obligated to do so in their 
relationship to the other states that have ratified the same treaties.  In essence, 
there is no relinquishment of the reciprocal nature of international treaties.  To 
illustrate, states A and B are in a human rights treaty relationship with each other 
and the treaty prohibits torture. State A tortures its prisoners.  The acts of torture 
violate the rights of the prisoners, but they also breach its treaty obligation in 
relationship to state B.  This conception concerns the traditional international 
obligations, breaches of which give rise to state responsibility as defined in 
Articles 1 and 2 of the ILC Articles.   
 
The scenario used in this example reflects the domestic operation of human 
rights law, as the violations are committed by State A in regard to its own citizens 
or residents.  However, the lack of application of state responsibility becomes 
increasingly more relevant in extraterritorial human rights relations. What if State 
A acts in a manner that violates the rights of State B’s residents, while they are 
within the territory of State B?  This example illustrates a lack of ‘reverse 
diplomatic protection’.  According to principles of customary international law, 
diplomatic protection may be afforded by one state if another state infringes upon 
the first state’s citizens while they are in the territory of the second state.76  The 
principle works on the basis that a violation of the rights of a citizen of one state 
by another state is considered a wrongful act against the citizen’s home state.77  
However, if one state violates the rights of a citizen of another state, while that 
citizen is in his/her home state, the principle of diplomatic protection does not 
seem to apply, or at least is not being used.78   
 
The problem faced in these situations is that while we have a definition as to 
what triggers state responsibility, namely a wrongful act on the part of a state, we 
have very little guidance as to what constitutes a wrongful act by states in 
extraterritorial relations, and in particular in human rights cases.  There is little 
international jurisprudence in this field, and what is available is not necessarily 
consistent.  As has been mentioned above, the ICJ has heard some relevant 
cases, in particular the Nicaragua case and the Genocide case, and so have 
regional courts and commissions (in particular the European Court on Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) and international 
criminal tribunals (in particular the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)).  What is common for these cases is that the courts, 
commissions and tribunals go to great lengths to determine, on the basis of the 
evidence available, the exact detail of control that one state may have had over 
the events in another state, events that have led to (often highly significant) 
human rights violations.   
                                                 
76 Lowe, Vaughan International Law, Oxford University  Press, 2007, p. 132 
77 Ibid.   
78 We have, however, seen that if a person has his/her human rights violated by their home state while 
residing in another state, extraterritorial application of human rights treaties have been accepted.  See for 
instance, Burgos Lopez v. Uruguay, for reference, see footnote 61 above. 
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In the Nicaragua case the ICJ considered, inter alia, whether the significant 
support by the United States to the contras in Honduras triggered responsibility 
for the actions taken by them when operating in Nicaragua.  The Court held that  
 
… the evidence available to the Court indicates that various forms of assistance 
provided to the contras by the United States have been crucial to the pursuit of their 
activities, but it is insufficient to demonstrate their complete dependence on the 
United States aid.79 [ …] The Court has taken the view … that United States 
participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, 
supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary 
targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself …. 
for the purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras 
in the course of their military or paramilitary operations.80  […] For this conduct to 
give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be 
proved that the State had effective control of the military and paramilitary operations 
in the course of which the alleged violations were committed. 81 
 
Furthermore, in the more recent Genocide case, the Court builds on the 
concept of ‘effective control’ from the Nicaragua case, and uses article 8 of the 
ILC Articles, when determining whether Serbia and Montenegro (FRY) could be 
considered to have responsibility for the genocide that had taken place in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.82  Article 8 holds that 
 
The conduct of a person or a group of persons shall be considered an act of a State 
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct. 
 
The question in this case was whether the Bosnian Serbs during the genocide 
had been under the “direction or control of” the government of the FRY.  
According to the applicants, up to 90 per cent of the material needs of the self-
proclaimed “Republic Srpska” (the Bosnian Serbs) had been provided by Serbia; 
a substantial portion of the Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces were being salaried 
by Serbia; and the economies of the Republic of Srpska and Serbia were almost 
completely integrated.83  This claim was not challenged by the Court,84 as it 
confirmed that  
 
the Respondent was thus making its considerable military and financial support 
available to the Republic Srpska, and had it withdrawn that support, this would have 
greatly constrained the options that were available to the Republic Srpska 
authorities.85 
                                                 
79 Nicaragua case, para. 110. Emphasis added.  
80 Ibid.; para. 115.  
81 Ibid. Emphasis added.  
82 Genocide case, para. 399  
83 Ibid., paras. 239 and 240.   
84 Gibney, 2007; p. 764 
85 Genocide case, para. 240.  
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Yet, the Court did not find that the FRY was legally responsible, because it  
 
is not established beyond any doubt in the argument between the Parties 
whether the authorities of the FRY supplied – and continued to supply – the 
[Bosnian Serb forces] who decided upon and carried out those acts of genocide 
with their aid and assistance, at a time when those authorities were clearly aware 
that genocide was about to take place or was under way ….86 
 
What these two cases decided by the ICJ illustrate is that the Court 
applies an extremely high threshold for responsibility.  In applying the concept of 
‘effective control’ over, or on whether a non-territorial state ‘directed or 
controlled’, the impugned actions, the ICJ seems to conclude that unless the 
foreign state has complete control over actions in a given situation, no legal 
responsibility can be attributed.  
 
The ICJ’s decisions demonstrate that, contrary to domestic legal systems, 
the international legal system does not utilise the concept of complicity by states 
in actions that lead to human rights violations in another state.87  This is at least 
the way in which the ICJ approaches serious human rights violations.  The ILC 
articles contain the possibility of complicity through the notion of ‘aid or 
assistance’ to another state for its commission of an internationally wrongful 
act.88  However, the ICJ has interpreted this ‘aid and assistance’ to be so 
significant that it represents ‘effective control’ over the situation, which more or 
less deprives the concept of complicity without any real meaning.  
 
As with domestic criminal cases, violations of international human rights 
law are often complex occurrences where more than one actor may be involved.  
In such circumstances, a concept of complicity (“aiding and abetting”) ought to be 
developed, to ensure that states may be held internationally responsible for their 
own actions or omissions.89  
 
b) Jurisdictional obstacles 
 
As was mentioned above, some human rights treaties contain provisions 
that provide that the rights guaranteed by the treaty shall be respected, protected 
and/or ensured within the jurisdiction and/or territory of the ratifying state.   This 
has resulted in a perceived geographical limitation which may be interpreted as 
                                                 
86 Ibid., Para. 422.  
87 It should be noted that complicity is provided for in international criminal law, but that concept refers to 
acts committed by individuals rather than states.  The complicity by individuals as a foundation for criminal 
responsibility is provided for in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), Article 25.  
88 ILC Articles, Article 16 – 18.  
89 The concept of complicity of non-state actors (such as multinational corporations) in human rights 
violations is addressed in Clapham, CAndrew, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2006, Clapham, Scott Jerbi and Andrew, Categories of Corporate Complicity, 24, 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 2001,  339 - 349;  
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granting these states impunity in terms of human rights conduct outside their own 
territory, or the territory covered by the relevant treaty.   
 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR provides:  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.90   
 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 
1, states 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.91   
 
Finally, Article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights states:  
 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and 
freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any 
discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social 
condition.92 
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights does not contain any 
specific jurisdictional or territorial limitation.93 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has found that article 1 contains a 
concept of ‘European legal space’ (‘espace juridique’) in the Bankovic case.94 
This case, which concerned the responsibility of 17 NATO states parties under 
the European Convention on Human Rights for the death and injury caused by 
the bombing of the television tower in Belgrade in 1999, was found by the Court 
to be inadmissible, mainly because the alleged human rights violations were not 
found to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, as the events took place outside 
the geographical area of the Convention, and the states in question did not have 
                                                 
90 Emphasis added.  
91 Emphasis added. 
92 Emphasis added.   
93     Article 1 reads: “The Member States of the Organization of African Unity parties to the present Charter 
shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt 
legislative or other measures to give effect to them.” 
94 European Court of Human Rights Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, 
EDHR 2001-XII (12 December 2001) For a critique of this case and the concept of a ‘legal space’ for human 
rights enjoyment, see Wilde, Ralph, Legal "Black Hole"? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty 
Law on Civil and Political Rights, 26, Michigan Journal of International Law, 2005,  739-806; , Gibney, Erik 
Roxstrom and Mark, The NATO Bombing Case [Bankovic c. Belgium et al.]: One Step Forward or Two 
Steps Back? Boston University Journal of International Law, 2005,  55 -136; , Wilde, Ralph, The "Legal 
Space" or "Espace Juridique" of the European Convention on Human Rights: Is it Relevant to Extraterritorial 
State Action? European Human Rights Law Review, 2005,  115-124;  
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‘effective control’ over the victims of the bombings.95  The Court dismissed the 
applicants’ arguments by holding that it was  
 
tantamount to arguing that  anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a 
Contracting State, wherever in the world that act may have been committed or its 
consequences felt, is thereby brought within the jurisdiction of that State for the 
purpose of Article 1 of the Convention. 
The Court is inclined to agree with the Governments’ submission that the 
text of Article 1 does not accommodate such an approach to “jurisdiction”. 
Admittedly, the applicants accept that jurisdiction, and any consequent State 
Convention responsibility, would be limited in the circumstances to the 
commission and consequences of that particular act. However, the Court is of the 
view that the wording of Article 1 does not provide any support for the applicants’ 
suggestion that the positive obligation in Article 1 to secure “the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention” can be divided and tailored in 
accordance with the particular circumstances of the extra-territorial act in 
question …96 
 
This position by the European Court of Human Rights raises a number of 
questions, including the issue as to whether states have impunity to commit 
human rights violations as long as they take place geographically outside the 
territorial reach of a regional human rights instrument.  This understanding of 
jurisdiction is very limited.   
 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR has a slightly different wording from that of 
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in that it uses the terms 
“within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”, while the ECHR only uses the 
provision “within their jurisdiction”. On the face of it, the ICCPR’s obligation article 
seems more limited than that of the ECHR.  However, in the travaux 
préparatoires of the ICCPR, it is explained that the UN Human Rights 
Commission chose to include the words “within its territory” because it might not 
be possible for a State to protect the right of persons subject to its jurisdiction 
when they are outside its territory.97    On the other hand, the Commission 
decided that a State should not be relieved of its obligations under the ICCPR to 
persons who remained within its jurisdiction merely because they were not within 
its territory. 98  Thus, this understanding represents a more practical than legal 
distinction, in that the drafters recognised that it would be difficult for a state to 
ensure the enjoyment of human rights in another state, but when such human 
rights enjoyment is threatened or influenced by acts from another state, that 
other state was not relieved of its obligations.  
 
                                                 
95
Bankovic case, para. 76 
96 Ibid., para. 75 
97 Bossuyt, M. J. Guide to the “Traveaux Preparatories” of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, p. 54 – referring to UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 138 and 
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98 Ibid., p. 53 – referring to E/CN.4/SR 194. 
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Therefore, it seems that there is confusion as to what this ‘jurisdictional’ 
limitation actually refers to in the ICCPR and the ECHR.  On one level one might 
question whether there is confusion between the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ and 
‘state responsibility’.  As Higgins clarifies, “the law of jurisdiction is about 
entitlements to act, the law of state responsibility is about obligations incurred 
when a state does act."99  Therefore, the violation of the human rights of 
individuals by a State outside its jurisdiction would imply that the State has 
committed an internationally wrongful act, and should not be able to do so with 
impunity.  This possibility of state action outside its jurisdiction becomes more 
sinister when assessed in light of recent developments where, for instance,  the 
United States (with the assistance of other states) has deliberately chosen to 
remove individuals from its territory (and therefore arguably from its jurisdiction) 
in order to deprive these individuals of their rights.100 The distinction between 
jurisdiction as related to a geographic area (territory),101 and jurisdiction as 
related to the effect and control a state has over the individual becomes 
essential.  If the protection from human rights treaties is dependent upon states 
acting within jurisdiction, the danger is that extra-jurisdictional acts can be carried 
out without responsibility being triggered.  
 
 
c) States’ concern about human rights developments  
 
The two obstacles discussed above concern the perceived legal 
hindrances in this debate.  There are also political obstacles to be overcome.  
States’ approaches to international human rights differ, and the international 
human rights climate changes over time.  Currently, developments within 
international human rights law seem to be under stress, in that states are 
increasingly resentful towards this legal regime which they see as limiting their 
freedom of manoeuvre.102  Indeed, the approach by the 17 NATO member states 
in the Bankovic case, which indicated that they did not consider themselves 
bound by international human rights law outside Europe, underscores the change 
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from a universal focus in human rights protection. It should be recognised that 
the Court, even if finding the case inadmissible, did not say that these countries 
could carry out human rights violations with impunity outside their territory. But by 
holding that the Court itself did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, the de facto 
result was that there were no Court procedures available for the individuals in 
that case, where they had been adversely affected by the actions of foreign 
states.  The decision in Bankovic can be interpreted as being based on a 
procedural limitation of the European Convention on Human Rights, but the 
result is impunity from legal redress for states.103  This demonstrates how far 
reality is from the ideals of universalism of human rights.  If states are able to 
carry out with impunity acts against individuals in another state that they are not 
able to carry out against their own population because of a narrow understanding 
of jurisdiction, the notion of universalism (and non-discrimination) does not carry 
much weight.   
 
It should be added to this discussion that the jurisprudence of the various 
Courts and UN Committees is not necessarily coherent in these cases, as has 
been shown above.  The ICJ, the regional courts and the UN Committees have 
decided cases in which extraterritorial obligations of states have been 
recognised.  While states may be more hesitant in affording human rights respect 
and protection to individuals in other states, this is clearly an area where the law 
is developing, and the views of international accountability structures may differ.  
 
Current approach in the international human rights community 
 
States are wary about further extending the human rights protection that 
they are obliged to respect and protect.  Particularly in a world where there is 
greater interaction among states, international organisations and multinational 
private actors, many states will see further human rights protection as limiting 
their options, and will resent it.  The events of 11 September 2001 and the 
following ‘war on terror’ have not helped the international human rights project.  
In this climate, extraterritorial obligations have not received much support from 
states.  Indeed, the portrayal of these obligations as extensions of obligations, or 
new obligations, indicates the reluctance of states to take these obligations 
seriously.  However, it has been demonstrated above that these obligations are 
not new; they are contained in the various human rights instruments starting with 
the UN Charter, and confirmed in international treaties as recently as 2006, with 
the adoption of the Convention n the Rights of People with Disabilities.   
 
This recognition, and the recognition that the way in which individuals are 
now often more dependent upon actions of foreign actors (including states) than 
their own government for their human rights enjoyment, has led actors in the 
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international human rights community to take these questions far more seriously.  
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has emphasised the 
need for states to take the effect of their development assistance, and actions 
through international financial institutions (such as the World Bank and the IMF) 
into account.104  Furthermore, they have also emphasised the need for poorer 
states to seek international assistance in situations where their domestic 
resources are insufficient to comply with their legal obligations in relationship to 
economic, social and cultural rights.105  Likewise, the Human Rights Committee 
has confirmed that the obligations under the ICCPR also extend beyond the 
territory of the state, for instance in situations where individuals are “within the 
power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, 
regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was 
obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party 
assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.”106  
The similar approach to extraterritorial obligations taken by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights was discussed above.107 
 
In addition to UN and regional human rights bodies, the attention to 
extraterritorial human rights obligations is also increasing in academic circles.  
There is now a growing body of literature on extraterritorial obligations.  This 
attention has also been matched by interest from the non-governmental human 
rights organisations, and several of these are now actively involved in 
documenting negative human rights effects as a result of foreign states’ 





There is a de facto difference between the proposed universal enjoyment 
of human rights from the accepted universal obligations of human rights. The 
proposition here is obviously that if we are advocating universal enjoyment of 
human rights, it does not make sense to limit the protection of human rights to 
national borders.  This essay has demonstrated that there are significant legal 
foundations for extraterritorial obligations in current international human rights 
law.  The drafters of human rights treaties from the 1940s onwards have been 
aware of the need for international cooperation in the implementation and the 
promotion of human rights, and this logically extends to the responsibility of 
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states for their own behaviour that has adverse effects on individuals’ human 
rights enjoyment in foreign states.  
There remain, however, obstacles to overcome to attain general 
recognition for these obligations.  These obstacles are both of a legal and 
political nature.  States are reluctant to accept what they conceive of as an 
extension of their human rights obligations.  This political obstacle is probably the 
most important one to address, as with an improved political climate, the 
(perceived) legal obstacles would be easier to address.  It is also necessary to 
develop an understanding of what extraterritorial obligations imply.  Some 
confusion about their extent exists, and further work on the content of the 
obligations and their limitations still need to be carried out. For instance, the 
obligation to provide assistance and how much, remains controversial.  
Furthermore, the relationship between the national and the foreign states’ 
obligations may still need further clarification. Nevertheless, if states take 
responsibility for the effect of their actions, whether committed at home or 
abroad, rather than trying to escape responsibility, this would be a big step 
forward.  Too much effort has been put into trying to evade responsibility, or to 
develop legal loopholes to do so, rather than to respond to the underlying 
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